I show that firms may optimally place their own equity with other firms in anticipation of possible future corporate control activity. In the model, a target and potential acquirer can negotiate before synergy values are learned. I find that equity implements an optimal mechanism, benefiting both firms at the expense of another potential bidder. The stake is limited by the outsider's willingness to investigate the target. The results imply that corporate control may motivate an equity sale even when no takeover activity is apparent at the time or occurs ex-post. I derive results on optimal stake sizes and block pricing.
Many firms sell blocks of their own equity to other firms. 1 Some of these transactions coincide with the formation of strategic alliances or other cooperative relationships, while others appear on the surface to be simple financing arrangements. These facts raise several interesting questions.
Are these transactions generally driven by strategic motives or are they purely financial in nature?
If there are important strategic factors, how do they affect the decision to sell equity and the terms of the sale?
Existing theories generally address these questions by analyzing the strategic effects of equity ownership in cooperative or competitive relationships. I approach the problem from a different perspective. Specifically, I investigate how the possibility of future corporate control activity can motivate interfirm equity sales. Empirically, the firms involved generally claim that no further control activity is planned, or do not publicly address control issues at all. However, it is common for the issuing firm to be acquired some time later by the block purchaser or a third party. 2 Using a mechanism design approach, I find that privately selling a block of equity to a potential acquirer before a takeover contest is initiated, or even guaranteed, can be an optimal strategy for a prospective target firm. The sale of equity enables the firms to extract surplus from another potential bidder, and do so as effectively as possible. While prior studies have shown that a stake owner will overbid in a takeover contest, 3 I show that this effect can be exploited by a target firm in partnership with a potential acquirer to implement a jointly optimal selling mechanism.
The analysis is based on a simple model where one firm may be a profitable future acquisition target for two other firms, but ex ante no one knows whether a takeover will be profitable or by how much. A key feature of the model is that the target can identify and approach one, and only one, of the potential acquirers before either firm learns its private synergy value for the target. This is consistent with the fact that equity sales often coincide with the formation of strategic alliances or other cooperative relationships. If these relationships help to generate information about the value of a takeover, as suggested by Mody (1993) , then the model's information structure may closely mimic the learning process in such cases. 4 Of course, the model will also apply to non-alliance situations where a target is able to identify a possible acquirer before values are learned.
I start with a general mechanism design problem, assuming that the target and its identified potential acquirer, the "insider," can commit to any selling mechanism in a very general class. I also assume that they can bargain efficiently, so they behave as a single entity, or coalition, in designing the selling mechanism. They can then split the expected surplus generated by the mechanism via an up-front transfer payment. As a coalition the bargainers either retain the object and realize the insider's takeover value, or sell it to an outsider with a random private value. Thus, in line with standard results, they seek to design a mechanism that implicitly makes an optimal take-it-orleave-it offer to the outsider, where the offer is contingent on the realization of the insider's value.
The aggressiveness of the offer is constrained by the outsider's willingness to pay an investigation cost to learn its value.
Next I show that the same outcome can be induced by transferring a block of the target's equity to the insider and committing to use a second-price or equivalent auction to allocate the target firm later. Intuitively, the implicit take-it-or-leave-it offer from the optimal mechanism is implemented in practice via the insider's bid in the second-price auction. The bid is inflated to the desired level by an appropriate amount of equity ownership. Even though the stake purchaser's synergy value is private and non-verifiable, and it behaves opportunistically in the auction, stake ownership binds it to behave optimally for the coalition. Thus, I show that the previously documented overbidding effect can be mapped precisely into the coalition's optimal mechanism, allowing them to attain their joint optimum in a realistic way. The paper's main result on the optimality of an equity sale can be viewed in two ways. In line with the formal derivation of the result, it can be viewed as the first step in the implementation of an optimal mechanism designed by the target and the insider. However, it can also be viewed as the solution to an optimal contracting problem between the target and insider when the form of the future takeover contest is exogenously specified as a second-price or English ascending-bid auction, as is generally assumed in the literature. The result is therefore applicable whether or not one believes that the bargainers can commit to a future auction format.
The model is consistent with existing evidence that abnormal returns around corporate equity purchases are closely related to future control events (see Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Choi (1991) ). 5 The model also implies that a stake sale can be motivated by the extraction of surplus in a future takeover even if it is not actually followed by a takeover, since the sale occurs before synergy values are known. In other words, ex post control outcomes do not imply ex ante motivations. Thus, the model is consistent with Allen and Phillips' (2000) finding that many firms remain independent after selling stakes to other firms.
The analysis also provides testable results for observed stake sizes. Since the outsider must be induced to investigate at some cost, the optimal stake size is defined by the point at which any additional equity would make investigation unprofitable. Thus, the stake size is naturally decreasing in the outsider's investigation cost. This implies that observed stake sizes should be closely related to how difficult it is for an outsider to learn about the value of a takeover. On the other hand, the stake size is increasing in the probability that a takeover turns out to be profitable, as this increases the outsider's expected payoff and offsets its investigation costs. This is consistent with existing evidence that firms entering alliances have larger abnormal returns when they simultaneously sell equity to their partner (Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) ).
The optimal stake size is also sensitive to changes in the ex ante probability distributions of the potential acquirers' synergy values. In particular, I show that any shift of the insider's distribution to one that is stochastically dominant (in the first-order sense) will decrease the optimal stake size. Intuitively, as the insider's distribution "improves," the outsider's expected payoff decreases, causing its participation constraint to bind at a lower stake size. Similar improvements in the outsider's distribution, on the other hand, can increase the optimal stake size as this increases the outsider's expected payoff and relaxes the participation constraint. It is not possible to generically characterize the type of improvements that generate this result, but it holds, for example, for an increase in the upper support of a uniform distribution or an increase in the mean of an exponential distribution. These results imply that observed stake sizes should be larger when an outside bidder is expected to be a relatively strong competitor in a future control contest.
Existing evidence shows that private placements are generally priced at a discount to the issuer's stock price, while trades of existing blocks are priced at a premium (see Hertzel, et al. (1999) , Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Barclay, et al. (2001) ). My model provides specific predictions relevant to the subset of private placements that involve strategic purchasers. The results depend on the exact specification of the continuation game that is played if the target and insider are unable to agree. Under the assumption that a standard second-price auction is held in case of disagreement, I find that the stake will always sell for a discount to the post-trade market price. The discount compensates the insider for its provision of a "public good" in the form of its overbidding behavior, which is ex post costly in states where it wins and has to pay more for the remaining equity than it is worth. The result can also be understood by noting that a third party buying existing equity after the insider acquires its stake would be willing to pay more per share because it can enjoy the benefits of the overbidding while suffering none of the costs.
I also consider a case where investigation costs are so high following disagreement that no learning takes place. This may be particularly relevant when stake sales are paired with an alliance or other activity that could facilitate learning. I find that discounts are still paid if the target's bargaining power is low, but premia may be paid if it is high. Intuitively, with low bargaining power for the target, any equity retained by the target will be worth more than its disagreement payoff. On the other hand, when θ T is high, the stakeholder has to pay out all of its expected surplus to the target. This will clearly result in a premium for stake sizes close to zero, because in these cases the target is effectively charging the potential acquirer a fee for the right to learn its value. At larger stake sizes, a premium is still possible due to this "informational rent," but in some cases the cost of overbidding will subsume this rent and generate a discount.
Related Literature
There has been significant prior work on the importance of block ownership for corporate control transactions. In particular, a number of papers have investigated the impact of exogenous toeholds in takeover contests. Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998) show that a bidder with a toehold will optimally overbid in a takeover auction with private values, which forms the basis for the fact that equity turns out to be optimal in my setting. Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) show that toeholds will also cause aggressive bidding in common value auctions, but bidders without toeholds will optimally respond by bidding more conservatively to avoid the winner's curse. Klemperer (2002) , among others, suggests that toehold ownership can cause other potential bidders to avoid takeover contests. Burkart, et al. (2000) show that an incumbent blockholder and a potential acquirer of the firm may choose to trade the block rather than compete in a tender offer contest. Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that block ownership can make a takeover attempt more likely if there are free rider problems among atomistic target shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also contribute to a line of research addressing the optimality of open market toehold purchases by prospective bidders. They show that if shareholdings are initially dispersed, it will not pay a potential blockholder to accumulate a block unless they can trade secretly. In a closely related paper, Kyle and Vila (1991) show that noise trader activity can make open market purchases by a potential raider more profitable, and increase the probability of a takeover. Other studies show that open market purchases may not be profitable despite the possibility of having to buy fewer shares if a takeover is successful (see Ravid and Spiegel (1999) , Chowdry and Jegadeesh (1994) , and Goldman and Qian (2003) ).
A few other papers in the corporate control literature also endogenize the formation of an equity block, but in settings that are quite distinct from mine. Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) (see above) discuss a target firm's incentive to "level the playing field" by selling a stake cheaply to a bidder without a toehold assuming another bidder already owns a toehold. Their analysis exogenously imposes an equity contract, and does not claim to explain stake sales apart from an immediate control contest. Zingales (1995) and Bebchuk and Zingales (2000) study an entrepreneur's incentives to allocate control and cash flow rights between himself and dispersed outside investors in anticipation of a future transfer of control. In contemporaneous work, Che and Lewis (2002) show that a target firm may sell a toehold directly to a potential bidder to encourage it to enter or initiate a takeover contest when there are significant investigation costs.
Finally, there are several explanations for corporate equity purchases that are not based on corporate control. Dasgupta and Tao (2000) , Van den Steen (2002) , and Harbaugh (2001) all construct models showing how equity stakes can solve traditional hold-up problems in cooperative relationships. Equity sales paired with strategic alliances and other cooperative relationships have received considerable attention recently because of their increasing popularity. 6 Empirical work by Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) and Allen and Phillips (2000) generally supports the hold-up theories, but could also be consistent with my model (see the discussion in sections II and III below). Related strands of literature have considered the role of corporate venture capital in the financing of start-up firms (Hellmann (2002) and Fulghieri and Sevilir (2001) ) and the industrial organization implications of cross ownership among direct competitors (see, e.g., Davidson and Deneckere (1984) , Reynolds and Snapp (1986) , Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Malueg (1992) ).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the model. The main results on the optimality of equity and a second-price auction are derived in section II. Section III provides comparative statics results for the optimal stake size. Section IV derives results on the price paid for the equity stake relative to the market price of the target's shares. Section V concludes. All proofs not derived in the text are collected in the Appendix.
I The Model Overview
Consider a firm that may be a valuable future takeover target for two other firms, but whose value in either transaction is currently unknown. Each potential acquirer's takeover value for the target's assets equals the target's stand-alone value plus a private net synergy value. 7 The joint distribution of synergy values is characterized by two regimes. In the no synergy regime both firms have zero synergies with the target. In the positive synergy regime the potential acquirers have independently distributed, non-negative private synergy values. 8 Information about both the prevailing regime and specific synergy values in the positive synergy regime can be obtained only if the potential acquirers pay an investigation cost that allows them to privately observe a signal revealing their value.
The potential acquirers arrive sequentially. Before any investigation can take place, the target firm is able to identify one of the potential acquirers, the "insider," and approach it to negotiate an agreement. The other potential acquirer, the "outsider," cannot be identified unless and until it has paid its investigation cost and learned its value. 9 The agreement between the target and insider can specify an up-front transfer payment and a takeover mechanism that will govern any transfer of ownership of the target's assets later. The outsider observes the terms of the agreement prior to deciding whether to pay its investigation cost. Since the target and insider negotiate prior to value discovery, they can bargain efficiently. Thus, they effectively have all of the bargaining power with respect to the unknown outsider. They choose the nature of future interaction and the outsider can only choose whether or not to investigate and participate in the specified mechanism.
Details
I assume that all managers act in the interests of their current shareholders and that the structure of the game is common knowledge. All parties are risk-neutral, and risk-free interest rates are zero.
Trading by any party in any context other than the negotiation and takeover mechanism is ruled out. 10 Without loss of generality, the target firm's stand-alone value is normalized to zero. The target, hereafter referred to as T , is an all-equity firm and there is one perfectly divisible share of equity outstanding. I assume that managers and original shareholders are uniquely identified with their firm, so all references to actions by a firm refer to actions by its managers and all references to a firm's payoffs refer to the payoffs of its original shareholders.
Each potential acquirer's unknown synergy value for T 's assets equals V i ∈ [0, λ i ], where i ∈ {I, O}, the insider is denoted by I and the outsider is denoted by O. The random variable Z ∈ {z − , z + } indexes the regime, i.e., Z = z − signifies the no synergy regime and Z = z + signifies the positive synergy regime. It is distributed such that Pr[Z = z + ] = s and Pr[Z = z − ] = (1 − s).
The synergy value can be realized only if 100% of the target firm's assets are acquired. Thus, a takeover is modeled as a payment to the target firm in exchange for its assets, where the payment is then distributed proportionally to the existing equity holders as a terminating dividend.
Conditional on the positive synergy regime (Z = z + ), the synergy values V i are independently distributed according to continuous distribution functions F i (·) with corresponding density functions f i (·) and support [0, λ i ]. 11 Throughout the paper I assume that the monotone hazard rate assumption holds for both distributions, i.e.
is the hazard function for i's distribution. This is a standard assumption that is satisfied by many common distributions, including the uniform, exponential, normal, logistic, extreme-value, chi-square, chi, and Laplace distributions, as well as any truncations thereof.
The order of play is as follows.
In Stage 1, T discovers the identity of potential acquirer I and can approach it to bargain over an agreement detailing a takeover mechanism (defined below) that will be used to govern any transfer of the target's assets in stage 3 if both acquirers choose to participate. They can also agree to an up-front transfer payment from the insider to the target, denoted as P . If the payment is positive, it is immediately distributed to the target's previously existing shareholders upon consummation of the agreement. I denote by A ∈ {0, 1} whether an agreement is reached between the target and insider. The details of any agreement become public knowledge immediately.
The bargaining game is modeled as generalized Nash bargaining (see Svejnar (1986) ) with bargaining powers of θ T for the target and (1 − θ T ) for the insider. The firms' disagreement payoffs, or threat points, are denoted generically as D T for the target and D I for the insider.
Specific formulations of the disagreement payoffs will be considered in section IV, where I analyze pricing issues; for now I simply assume that there is scope for agreement, i.e., that the bargainers' maximized joint surplus exceeds the sum of their disagreement payoffs. This implies that agreement will always be reached in equilibrium, and that choosing to negotiate with the insider will always be optimal for the target. I show later that this assumption will hold very generally, even when the target is allowed to choose from a very general class of selling mechanisms following disagreement.
To define the space of allowable takeover mechanisms, I use a modified version of the standard mechanism design problem outlined in chapter 5 of Krishna (2002) . A takeover mechanism (β, Γ, µ) consists of the following: a set of possible "messages" or "bids" β i for each potential acquirer, an allocation rule Γ : β ×{z − , z + } −→ ∆, where ∆ is the set of probability distributions over {I, O, T }, and a payment rule µ : β × {z − , z + } −→ R 2 . The allocation rule gives the probability that each player will get the target's assets conditional on the set of messages and realization z of Z, and the payment rule gives the expected payment to T by i.
In Stage 2, the potential acquirers can privately learn their synergy values by paying an investigation cost c i (A). This cost represents any resources expended by the acquirers in investigating the target, including the opportunity cost of management time. I assume that the cost of learning synergy values may be reduced if an agreement is reached by the target and insider, i.e., c i (0) ≥ c i (1) for all i. This is meant to reflect the real-life possibility that the negotiation between the target and insider may also involve some form of cooperation, such as an alliance, that could generate important information about the value of a takeover.
Payment of c i (A) by i results in the observance of the realization of Z plus a private, unverifiable signal of v i , the realization of the synergy value V i . For simplicity, I assume throughout that c I (1) = 0, and that the target costlessly observes the realization of Z if either potential acquirer chooses to investigate. Note that I am also making the implicit assumption that the outsider's signal is just as precise as the insider's signal, which may be unrealistic if the insider's information is obtained through an alliance. However, since all parties are risk-neutral, adding random noise to the outsider's signal will not affect the equilibrium.
In Stage 3, if synergies are positive (Z = z + ) and an agreement was reached in stage 1, the buyers first choose whether to participate in the takeover mechanism and then the mechanism is implemented if appropriate. Finally, any payments to the target firm are proportionally distributed to its shareholders and all values are realized.
Throughout the paper I assume that the potential acquirers cannot participate in the mechanism unless they have learned their values, 12 and that once they agree to participate, they cannot refuse to abide by the outcome (i.e., a bidder cannot renege). I also assume that if a potential acquirer chooses not to participate in the mechanism, they have no recourse to acquire the target's assets.
If only one potential acquirer chooses to participate in the mechanism (or only one investigates), the target can present it with a take-it-or-leave-it offer for control of its assets. 13 I discuss in section IV what happens in stage 3 in case of disagreement in stage 1.
Discussion
In the model, all parties share common ex ante beliefs about both synergy value distributions, but only the potential acquirers can observe their actual values. This does not mean that the model will only apply when firms have no private information prior to value discovery. What is required for the results is that any ex ante information asymmetry is insufficient to preclude mutually agreeable trade, and that the individual acquirers are able to learn more about their own values than any of the other players, i.e., the "degree" of information asymmetry increases as values are learned. This structure is appropriate, for example, when refining beliefs about synergy values requires specific information about the acquirers that is costly or impossible for someone outside the firm to observe.
An important assumption in the model is that the bargainers can commit to a mechanism in stage 1. As will be discussed later, it turns out that the bargainers would arrive at an equivalent contracting solution if the stage 3 interaction were exogenously specified as a standard second-price or English ascending-bid auction with no reserve, which is a standard assumption in the literature.
Since the investigation costs are deadweight costs that are not paid to the target, the model implicitly assumes that the target cannot charge both potential acquirers an ex ante entry fee for the right to investigate and/or participate in the auction. If it could do so, the solution of the model would be trivial: the target would commit to hold an efficient auction in stage 3 (such as a second-price auction with no reserve), and charge each potential acquirer an ex ante fee equal to its expected payoff. The target would thus generate and fully extract the maximum possible overall expected surplus. The situation faced by the target in the model therefore represents a "second-best" world where it either cannot identify all potential suitors, cannot control the flow of information, or cannot commit never to sell itself, which seems reasonable for the problem at hand.
II Equity and the Optimal Mechanism
Before moving on to the derivation of the optimal mechanism, I first set up the general problem faced by the bargainers at stage 1. Let π i , i ∈ {I, O, T }, denote party i's expected continuation payoff for the subgame equilibrium induced by the stage 1 agreement, excluding the initial transfer P and any investigation costs paid in equilibrium. Since the insider's investigation cost is zero if an agreement is reached, generalized Nash bargaining between the target and insider in stage 1 will correspond to the maximization of the quantity
Since P represents a simple transfer from the insider to the target, this can be conceptualized as a two-stage problem: in the first stage the bargainers set the terms of the takeover mechanism to maximize their "coalition" continuation payoff, π Coalition ≡ π T + π I , and in the second stage they maximize (1), evaluated at the chosen terms, with respect to P .
For simplicity, from this point on I assume that the outsider's investigation cost following agreement, c O (1), is low enough that it would choose to investigate if a standard second-price auction with no reserve would be held in stage 3. 14 Given this assumption, and since the coalition can never do worse than realizing the insider's value, the maximization of π Coalition will clearly be constrained by ensuring the outsider's participation. The terms of the agreement will therefore have to satisfy the outsider's incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR), or participation, constraints.
The Optimal Direct Mechanism
This problem can be solved by assuming that the mechanism designer chooses a direct mechanism, in which the bidders are asked to directly report their values v i . For this purpose, allocations and payments will be defined by the pair (Q,M), consisting of functions Q :
gives the probability that player i will get the target's assets with the report vector v ≡ (v I , v O ) and realization z of Z, and correspondingly M i (v, z) gives the expected payment by i. The Revelation Principle states that for any mechanism from the more general class with an equilibrium, there is a direct mechanism where truthful reporting is an equilibrium and the outcomes are the same as for the equilibrium of the original mechanism. Thus, there is no loss of generality in maximizing over the set of direct mechanisms.
Throughout this subsection I make the additional assumption that the bargainers can contractually agree that the insider will participate in the mechanism and truthfully report its value if the mechanism is implemented. 15 This extends the generality of the solution and implies that the insider's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, and therefore the mechanism's payment rule for the insider, can be safely ignored for the remainder of this subsection. It is also important to note that no messages are actually required when Z = z − since the target observes the realization of Z and no allocation among the parties can affect anyone's surplus in this regime.
So the only thing to be determined for the case where Z = z − is any required payment from the outsider to the target, denoted henceforth by M z − O . The full proof of the solution to this problem relies on standard techniques and is given in the Appendix. Here I provide a simple discussion that highlights the intuition behind the optimal mechanism. The key to this discussion is realizing that the target and insider can be thought of as a single player within the mechanism, the "coalition." This is true because they jointly design the takeover mechanism as part of an efficient bargaining process, and they can contract perfectly on the insider's behavior within the mechanism. Thus, one can think of the coalition as either retaining the target's assets and realizing the insider's value v I or transferring them to the outsider.
Ignoring the fact that the outsider must pay an investigation cost to learn its value, this problem is precisely analogous to that faced by a monopolist with a single good facing a lone buyer with a random value for the good. Just like the monopolist, the coalition has all of the bargaining power with respect to the outsider ex ante since it has the ability to design the takeover mechanism.
The monopolist's optimal selling mechanism has been studied widely. As such, it is well known that if the distribution of the buyer's value satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, the monopolist will find it optimal to design a mechanism that corresponds to a take-it-or-leave-it (tioli) offer to the buyer. To derive the optimal offer, first
be defined as the outsider's "virtual valuation." Now, following Bulow and Roberts (1989) , think of the coalition as a monopolist facing the outsider alone and setting a tioli price, say b. You could say that it faces a "demand" curve for the outsider equal to 1 − F O (b). You can then write the bidder's inverse demand function as b(q) ≡ F −1 O (1 − q), which translates into a "revenue" function for the monopolist of qb(q) = qF −1 O (1 − q). Taking the derivative with respect to q and simplifying shows that
. Finding the optimal tioli offer then boils down to setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. In this case, the marginal cost to the coalition of giving the target's assets to the outsider equals the insider's value, v I . Thus, assuming v I < λ O , the optimal tioli offer b for a given value
The firm's assets will thus be sold to the outsider whenever v O > b, or in terms of virtual valuations,
the coalition would simply retain the object. This allocation can be implemented in a direct mechanism by comparing the insider's value with the outsider's virtual valuation and awarding the target's assets according to whichever is greater. When the outsider is awarded the assets, it pays a price equal to the optimal tioli offer b, which is the lowest value it could report and still obtain the target's assets, and otherwise it pays nothing. This would be sufficient to characterize the optimal mechanism in the absence of an investigation cost for the outsider, which adds an additional wrinkle. Since the potential acquirers pay their costs at the same time, the only opportunity for efficient bargaining occurs prior to their investigation decision. Thus, the coalition must choose a mechanism that satisfies the outsider's participation constraint, i.e., it must be such that the outsider finds it optimal to pay its investigation cost.
Formally, the mechanism must be such that
where
on the left-hand side of the inequality is the probability of positive synergies times the outsider's expected payoff under the mechanism in that regime, and the second term is the probability of the no synergy regime times the outsider's required payment in that regime. Since the standard monopoly problem is generally solved assuming that the buyer already knows its value, the coalition's aggressiveness in the mechanism may have to be tempered relative to that of the monopolist in order to preserve the outsider's participation. As the following proposition shows, the optimal direct mechanism deals with the outsider's participation constraint in a very simple way, utilizing a slight modification of the outsider's virtual valuation.
Proposition 1
The following is an optimal mechanism:
an allocation rule for states with positive synergies
and a payment rule for the outsider
either is set so that Q satisfies the participation constraint (2) with equality, or equals zero and (2) is satisfied with inequality.
Ignoring the parameter γ, it is clear that this corresponds to the mechanism derived for the standard monopoly problem. With γ = 0 and Z = z + , the allocation rule Q awards the target's assets to the outsider when its virtual valuation is higher than the insider's actual value, and otherwise awards them to the insider. The payment rule requires no payment from the outsider unless it gets the firm's assets. When the outsider does receive the firm's assets, it pays a price b * that is defined analogously to the monopolist's optimal tioli offer. Now consider the parameter γ that differentiates the outsider's "modified" virtual valuation,
, and thus distinguishes the coalition's optimal tioli offer b * from the monopolist's. If the outsider's participation constraint is not satisfied under the optimal mechanism with γ = 0, this means that if the coalition is expected to behave as aggressively as a monopolist in the subsequent sale, the outsider will choose not to investigate. Thus, they must temper their behavior and commit not to act so aggressively. It is easy to see that their "aggressiveness" is decreasing in γ. At γ = 1, the outsider will receive the assets whenever its value is above the insider's, which can be thought of as a tioli offer by the coalition equal to its own value. As γ decreases, the tioli offer increases, until at γ = 0 it equals the coalition's optimal offer when there are no investigation costs. Thus, a higher cost of investigation for the outsider forces the coalition to commit to less aggressive behavior via a higher γ to ensure the outsider's participation. It is easy to see that, absent investigation costs, the coalition's payoff will be monotonically increasing as γ decreases toward 0, just as a monopolist's expected payoff increases as the price is raised as long as MR<MC (also see the proof of Proposition 1).
It is interesting to consider at this point why the coalition doesn't just subsidize the outsider's investigation cost by guaranteeing it a fixed payment no matter what happens. This would allow the coalition to set γ = 0 while ensuring the outsider's participation. However, this turns out to be sub-optimal. While the coalition's payoff decreases as γ rises, the total surplus generated by the mechanism increases because the assets are retained less often when the outsider has a higher value. In other words, an increase in γ helps the outsider more than it hurts the coalition. So if the outsider is unwilling to investigate at γ = 0, by increasing γ the bargainers can increase the outsider's expected surplus at a cost of less than a dollar per dollar increase, and this turns out to be the most efficient solution.
It is also instructive to compare the optimal mechanism with the result of another standard problem, where the mechanism is designed by the target after the potential acquirers already know their values. The solution to this problem allocates the target's assets to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation, provided it is greater than zero (see Krishna (2002) ). Thus, the target allocates the assets to the bidder with which it has the highest marginal revenue (as long as it is positive), and the winning bidder pays a price equal to the smallest reported value that would allow it to win. This maximizes the target's expected revenue by extracting as much expected surplus as possible from the two bidders while leaving them an "informational rent" that is necessary to induce their participation. However, there is a cost to total surplus because the target retains the assets in some cases where there is scope for gains from trade.
Proposition 1 shows that instead of comparing the two acquirers' virtual valuations, the optimal mechanism for my case compares the outsider's modified virtual valuation to the insider's actual value. This results from the fact that the target and insider can bargain efficiently ex ante over sharing their expected joint surplus. In a sense they eliminate a layer of inefficiency that would otherwise arise from the target's attempt to extract the insider's surplus, and they do so by getting rid of cases where the target inefficiently retains its own assets. They also use their superior information about (and claim to) the insider's value, relative to an uninformed target designing the mechanism in isolation, to reduce the outsider's informational rent and extract as much surplus as possible subject to the outsider's participation constraint.
The Optimality of Equity
I now show that an equity contract together with a second-price or equivalent auction can be used to generate the same outcome as the direct mechanism derived above, and thus defines a realistic and empirically relevant way for the firms to implement an optimal mechanism. As noted in the introduction, prior studies have shown that equity ownership will cause the stakeholder to overbid in a takeover contest. Here I show that this effect can be exploited by a target and potential acquirer to achieve their jointly optimal outcome even if their contracting ability is significantly constrained.
To begin, first note that the transfer of an equity stake in the target to the insider at stage 1 combined with the specification of a standard second-price auction to be used at stage 3 effectively corresponds to a mechanism within the general class allowed by the model. The bids in the second price auction are the acquirers' "messages," and the payment rule of the mechanism just nets out the combined effect of the payments required by the auction rules and the equity contract. Thus, to show that an equity contract together with a second price auction is optimal, it remains to prove that it results in the same outcome as the direct mechanism derived above. Note that from this point on I drop the assumption that the bargainers can contractually specify the insider's future behavior.
To begin, I assume that a standard second-price auction with no reserve is held in stage 3. I also assume that the insider owns an equity claim against the target firm equal to a proportion α of the total equity outstanding. The analysis of the bidding behavior in the second-price auction basically follows that of Burkart (1995) , the only difference being the possibility of asymmetry in the supports of the bidders' synergy value distributions. I assume throughout that all bids correspond to a valuation for 100% of the firm's assets, although the insider will effectively pay only (1 − α) times the corresponding sale price if it wins.
It is well known that bidders in a standard second-price auction with private values have a weakly dominant strategy of bidding their value. This strategy is still weakly dominant for the non-owner, or the outsider in this case, when one of the bidders owns part of the object being sold.
Given this strategy for the outsider, the insider selects its bid, b I , conditional on its signal of value v I , its ownership stake α, and the distribution of the outsider's value (and therefore the outsider's
The first term is the profit I gets from the buyout of its stake if O wins the auction times the probability of that event, the second term is the asset value I realizes if it wins the auction times the probability of winning, and the third term represents the expected payment by I to T net of the cash it will receive back due to its equity claim on T . Note that if λ E > λ O , this objective function is valid only as long as
will be indifferent among all bids weakly
Maximizing the objective function (3) with respect to the insider's bid b I shows 16 that the insider's optimal bid is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
The insider's bid obviously exceeds its value as α multiplies one over O's hazard function evaluated at I's bid, which is positive. Thus, ownership makes the insider a more aggressive bidder. The overbidding occurs because the insider's bid represents both a bid for the remaining shares of T and an ask for its own block. Note that I's bid is increasing in both α and its own value, v I . Now note the correspondence between this bidding behavior by I and the allocation rule of the optimal mechanism described in Proposition 1. The optimal mechanism requires that for a given realization of the insider's value, v I , the insider get control of the target's assets if and only if that value exceeds the outsider's modified virtual valuation,
. This allocation can be accomplished in a second-price auction if the insider bids such that it wins the auction whenever
. To implement this, the insider's bid b I should be such that b I = b * as defined in Proposition 1. Thus the insider's bidding strategy should solve
Finally, note that this bidding strategy is equivalent to that defined in (4) when α = (1 − γ).
This analysis implies that transferring sufficient new equity to I such that I's proportional ownership α equals (1 − γ) will result in an allocation of the target's assets that conforms to the optimal direct mechanism, assuming a second-price auction is subsequently used to sell the assets.
The bargainers should be able to use this correspondence to implement an optimal mechanism via a stage 1 agreement as long as it is incentive compatible and individually rational for all players, and specifies equivalent payments from the outsider. The following proposition shows that this is, in fact, the case.
Proposition 2 The following stage 1 agreement implements an optimal mechanism:
(1) commit to hold a standard second-price or equivalent auction with no reserve for 100% of the target firm's assets in stage 3 if Z = z + ;
(2) transfer The intuition behind Proposition 2 is quite straightforward. When the insider bids more than its value because of its equity stake in the target, it is effectively setting a reserve price with respect to the outsider. I noted above that the optimal direct mechanism boils down to the coalition of the bidder and target committing to set a jointly optimal reserve price, subject to the outsider's participation constraint. Proposition 2 shows that exactly the same reserve price setting behavior can be implemented even without cooperation at the bidding stage by giving the insider
shares of new equity in T , which corresponds to a proportional holding of
Holding the equity credibly commits the insider to behave optimally for the coalition even though it chooses its bid in the stage 3 auction independently. Thus, equity represents an optimal contract between the target and insider when the insider's private value in unverifiable and the insider behaves opportunistically in the subsequent second-price auction.
It is interesting to note that this result implies that equity will be the optimal contract between the target and insider even if the later-stage interaction between the parties is exogenously constrained to take the form of a second-price or English ascending-bid auction. 17 Prior work on takeovers has generally assumed this form of contest due to the nature of existing laws that require boards to act as efficient auctioneers when their firms are put up for sale, as well as the public nature of tender offer battles that involve ascending bids by competing acquirers. Thus, even if the assumption that the bargainers can commit to a stage 3 auction format in stage 1 is invalid, the same equity stake will still constitute an optimal contract when the standard format is imposed. 18
It is also interesting to note that Proposition 2 implies that if the outsider's participation constraint is never binding, the agreement will actually involve a 100% sale of the firm's equity to the insider in stage 1. 19 The intuition for this is clear. When the bargainers can be as aggressive as they want in specifying the takeover mechanism, they will want their aggressiveness to match that of a single owner of the firm facing a single buyer and setting an optimal reserve price. This can only be implemented via an equity transfer if 100% is transferred because only at this point will the insider act exactly as a single owner of the firm.
I now briefly return to my original assumption that there is scope for agreement, i.e., that the bargainers' joint surplus from the equilibrium in Proposition 2 exceeds the sum of their disagreement payoffs. Since the equilibrium represented in Proposition 2 results from efficient bargaining and its outcome conforms to the optimal direct mechanism from Proposition 1, this assumption will clearly hold for any disagreement game that involves the implementation of another mechanism within the same general class (which includes all standard auction formats). Specifically, it will hold if such a mechanism is exogenously imposed following disagreement or if the target is able to independently choose and commit to a mechanism. So choosing to bargain with the insider at stage 1 will be optimal for the target under any such assumption.
Empirical Implications and Relation to Existing Evidence
The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 has a number of interesting empirical implications.
First, if the market does not anticipate the transaction or later potential takeover, then the model predicts an increase in the market value of the target's existing shares at the announcement of the stake sale equal to its total expected payoff less its stand-alone value, or π T + P . However, if synergy values turn out to be zero (Z = z − ) and no takeover materializes, the target's stock will exhibit negative abnormal returns over time as the market learns that the firm is not a viable takeover target. This is exactly the pattern observed by Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) , Choi (1991) and Barclay and Holderness (1991) , although their samples do not focus specifically on direct sales of equity. To my knowledge this hypothesis has not been tested on a large sample of direct sales.
Next, note that the model implies that some stake sales undertaken to extract surplus in a future takeover will not actually be followed by a takeover. In fact, the probability of a takeover (s) may be quite low and still lead to an equity sale when the outsider's investigation costs (c O (1)) are low relative to the outsider's expected payoff in the auction. Thus, the evidence provided by Allen and Phillips (2000) that many firms remain independent indefinitely after selling stakes to other firms is actually consistent with the model. Allen and Phillips (2000) also find that issuers in alliance deals experience higher abnormal returns than those without alliances. As discussed above, my model will be particularly applicable to alliance situations if alliances allow potential acquirers, and perhaps outsiders, to learn about their value for the firm in a takeover. It therefore seems reasonable that stake sales concurrent with alliances may be more likely to signal a potentially profitable takeover (or a greater increase in the probability of one) than stake sales without alliances. This could imply higher abnormal returns, depending, of course, on the motivation for the other sales.
Finally, the model has implications for empirical studies on the effects of toeholds in takeover contests. The existing evidence is mixed. Some studies find that toeholds are negatively related to target returns (e.g., Betton and Eckbo (2000)), while others find that they are positively related (e.g., Franks and Harris (1989) ) or unrelated (e.g., Stulz, et al. (1990) ). However, none of these studies investigate the origins of the toeholds in their samples, i.e., whether they were accumulated via open market purchases or were part of an earlier private sale by the target. The present model implies that in cases where a toehold is sold by the target firm prior to the initiation of a takeover contest, the original target shareholders' total expected payoff should be increased by the toehold sale, which will be reflected both in the initial price paid by the bidder for the toehold and the expected takeover price. Furthermore, conditional on a takeover occurring, the target shareholders' expected payoff should increase in the size of the stake.
III Optimal Stake Sizes
For a given set of parameters and synergy value distributions, Proposition 2 implicitly defines an optimal proportion of the post-issuance target equity that the insider should own, (1 − γ). Let α * ≡ (1 − γ) therefore denote the implied "optimal stake size." Assuming an interior solution (γ ∈ (0, 1)) and letting the probability of a takeover and the outsider's investigation costs vary, the following comparative statics for the optimal stake size are easily derived.
Proposition 3
The optimal stake size, α * , is increasing in the probability of a takeover (s) and decreasing in the outsider's cost of investigation (c O (1)).
The intuition for these results is straightforward. An increase in the probability of the positive synergy regime increases the outsider's overall expected payoff, relaxing its participation constraint.
This allows the coalition to behave more aggressively, which is accomplished via a larger stake size.
An increase in the cost of investigation has precisely the opposite effect.
Since the optimal stake size is determined by the satisfaction of the outsider's participation constraint, it is clear that it will also vary with changes in the two potential acquirers' synergy value distributions in the positive synergy regime, since any such changes will affect the outsider's expected payoff. It is possible to characterize an intuitive analytical result for changes in the insider's distribution based on the concept of first-order stochastic dominance. For this purpose, I
define any transformation from one distribution, say F (v) to another distribution, say F 0 (v), with the same support to be a positive stochastic shift in the distribution if
Proposition 4 The optimal stake size, α * , decreases with any positive stochastic shift in the insider's synergy value distribution.
A shift to a more dominant distribution for the insider does not affect its bid for any realization of its value, but it makes its higher values more likely, which directly reduces the outsider's expected payoff. Thus, the coalition must decrease the amount of equity transferred since the outsider will choose not to investigate otherwise. A shift in the outsider's distribution, on the other hand, will affect the outsider's expected payoff both directly, by making its own higher values more likely, and indirectly, because the insider's optimal bid will increase for every realization of its value (except any value above λ O ). A similar analytical characterization based on stochastic orders is therefore difficult. However, it is easy to characterize how one would test whether a particular distributional shift will result in a change in the optimal stake size. One must simply determine whether, under the new distribution, the outsider would choose to participate if the stake were set equal to the optimal stake size under the old distribution. This can summed up as follows.
Condition 1
The optimal stake size, α * , will increase with any transformation of the outsider's synergy value distribution such that the outsider's participation constraint (2) holds with inequality when measured using the new synergy value distribution and the optimal stake size associated with the old distribution.
Again, the intuition is clear. A shift in the outsider's distribution that increases its expected payoff, even given the induced change in bidding behavior by the insider, will result in a larger optimal stake size as the coalition seeks to extract more surplus from the outsider. They will, of course, increase their surplus extraction via a larger stake size up to the point where the outsider's participation constraint is again binding. Some examples of distributional shifts that can be shown analytically to satisfy this condition include an increase in the upper support of a uniform distribution and a decrease in the (constant) hazard rate of an exponential distribution. Numerical simulations also show that an increase in the mean parameter of a truncated normal distribution will generally satisfy it. Intuitively, these all correspond to cases where the mean of the outsider's value increases, and thus the coalition sells more equity to extract more of the outsider's expected surplus.
Empirical Implications
These results have several interesting empirical implications. First, note that Proposition 3 predicts that an equity stake is more likely to be sold the higher is the probability of a takeover (the higher is s). Thus, if strategic alliances allow firms to learn about the value of further integration, a simultaneous stake sale could signal a higher likelihood of a profitable takeover. This is consistent with the finding of Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) that firms that sell equity when forming strategic alliances have larger announcement returns on average than those that form alliances but do not sell equity. Proposition 3 also obviously implies that observed stake sizes should be closely related to the probability of a subsequent control contest and the difficulty of determining synergy values, which could be proxied by the degree of asymmetric information or uncertainty. Proposition 4
implies that larger stake sales should be expected the more disadvantaged an equity purchaser is in competition against an outside bidder. The more hotly contested an acquisition is expected to be, the larger the equity stake should be.
IV Stake Pricing
In this section I derive results for the pricing of the equity stake relative to the target's market value.
It is a stylized fact that private placements of equity are priced at a discount to the pre-trade stock price of the issuing firm on average. 20 However, Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Barclay, et al. (2001) find that sales of existing blocks are generally priced at a premium to the issuing firm's posttrade stock price. Allen and Phillips (2000) find that block purchases by corporations, including both private placements and trades of existing blocks, generally trade at a premium to the pre-trade price, although they do not have data for the equity alliances in their sample. My model provides predictions relevant to more focused investigations of private placements to corporate acquirers.
Throughout this section I assume that the transfer payment P represents the price paid for the equity. To avoid having to specify what, exactly, the market knows prior to the stake sale, I consider the sale price relative to the post-trade price of the target's stock, which is defined as the market price immediately following the announcement and consummation of the sale. This is a common measure used in the literature on block trades as it is a clear measure of whether the acquirer paid more or less than "fair value," i.e., more or less than the equity is worth, given that the transaction takes place, to a third party.
In the present context, I define the post-trade price of the common stock as the expected continuation payoff per target share immediately after the public announcement of the stake sale, which I assume takes place at the end of stage 1 following the consummation of the sale and the distribution of the proceeds. I also assume that the market has the same information as the agents in the game following the announcement of the sale (which does not include actual synergy values, but does include the chosen auction format and side-payment contract).
Since I have assumed that there is one target share outstanding and that the target issues new shares to the insider, the post-trade price per share is simply the target's continuation payoff, π T .
According to Proposition 2 the target issues
(1−γ) γ new shares to the insider, and with the definition of the optimal stake size α * ≡ (1 − γ), the number of shares can also be written as α * 1−α * , and the price paid per share can be written as 1−α * α * P . I define the stake sale premium (discount) as the percentage premium (discount) paid over (under) the post-trade price, or
As noted previously, the generalized Nash bargaining game between the target and insider can be conceptualized as a two stage problem where they first set the stake size, α * , and commit to a second-price auction, and then they determine the transfer price according to their relative bargaining strengths and threat points. Thus, for a chosen stake size α * they maximize (1), conditional on a transfer of that stake followed by a second-price auction, with respect to P . The resulting price is
To analyze the equilibrium premium, I need a specification for the threat points, D I and D T .
This requires a full description of what happens in the continuation game following disagreement in stage 1. I derive results for two cases. In the first case I assume a standard second-price auction with no reserve is exogenously imposed at stage 3 in case of disagreement. As noted earlier, this is a standard assumption in the literature on takeovers, and is consistent with an interpretation of the model in which the auction format is exogenous and equity arises as an optimal contract between the target and insider in stage 1. For simplicity, I assume in this case that the noagreement costs of investigation for the two parties, c I (0) and c O (0), are low enough that both will choose to investigate and participate in the auction. In the second case I assume that the costs of investigation are so high absent an agreement in stage 1 that no investigation will occur. This is meant to reflect situations where some kind of product market cooperation is contemplated between the target and insider as part of the original negotiation, and failure of the negotiation means no such cooperation takes place, making learning very difficult for all parties.
In the first case, with an exogenously imposed second-price auction, the players' disagreement payoffs, or threat points, will equal their expected continuation payoffs following disagreement. For the target, this equals zero in the no synergy regime and it equals the expected sales price from the auction in the positive synergy regime. The insider, on the other hand, pays c I (0) up front, gets zero in the no synergy regime, and gets its expected auction payoff in the positive synergy regime.
Analyzing (5) using this specification yields the following result.
Proposition 5 Assume a standard second-price auction with no reserve would be held in stage 3
following disagreement in stage 1. Then the equity stake will always sell for a discount to the target's post-trade price.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The difference between the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2 and an exogenously imposed second-price auction with no stake sale boils down to the insider's overbidding behavior. This behavior raises the partners' joint payoff, but the insider pays an ex-post "cost" in that it sometimes wins the auction and pays more for the equity than it is worth. The discount paid for the stake up front is effectively compensating the insider for that cost. It can also be thought of as compensation for providing the "public good" of overbidding.
Thus, selling an equity stake to a potential acquirer for less than it is worth to a third party can sometimes be beneficial for a firm's shareholders. From their point of view, the strategic benefit from the overbidding behavior outweighs the cost of the discount.
Now consider the second case, where no investigation will take place in the absence of an agreement. In this case, the disagreement payoffs are both zero. The next result follows.
Proposition 6 Assume no investigation takes place if the bargainers disagree in stage 1. Then the equity stake will always sell for a discount to the target's post-trade price if the target's bargaining power (θ T ) is sufficiently low. If θ T is high, small stakes will always sell for a premium, and large stakes may sell for a premium or discount.
There is no unambiguous pricing outcome for all parameter values, but the intuition for the cases covered in the proposition is clear. When θ T is low, the target may actually have to pay the insider for taking the equity, since the target only has to be made whole relative to its disagreement payoff of zero, and any equity it retains allows it to enjoy part of the subsequent takeover premium.
On the other hand, when θ T is high the insider has to pay out all of its surplus to the target. This will clearly result in a premium for stake sizes close to zero, because in these cases P is effectively an additional cost of investigation for the insider. It pays the target for the right to investigate at a lower cost, which is always worth some positive amount, even if little or no equity is transferred.
At larger stake sizes, a premium is still possible due to this additional investigation cost, but it is also possible for the insider's cost of overbidding to dominate and generate a discount.
A simple inspection of the premium equation (5) together with the equation for the equilibrium price (6) yields the following result.
Proposition 7
The premium paid for the equity stake is increasing in the target's bargaining power, θ T , the insider's no-agreement cost of investigation, c O (0), and any change in the disagreement game that (weakly) raises D T while (weakly) lowering D I .
The first two comparative statics are straightforward. An increase in the target's bargaining power obviously increases the price P with no effect on the continuation payoffs π i , raising the premium. An increase in the outsider's no-agreement cost of investigation, when it is relevant, impacts the premium equation only by raising the price through the decrease in D I , and thus has the same mechanical effect. The final result on simultaneous changes in D T and D I is, again, simple and mechanically the same, but it provides some insight into how the results derived above would change for a different specification of the disagreement game. For example, instead of assuming that a second-price auction is exogenously imposed following disagreement, one could assume that the target is able to design a superior mechanism that satisfies the two potential acquirers' participation constraints but extracts more of their surplus than a standard second-price auction. Clearly, this will raise D T and lower D I resulting in a larger premium for the same optimal stake size.
It is worth noting that if the stake sale proceeds are invested in a zero NPV project and the resulting payoff is distributed pro rata along with the other values in Stage 3, all of the results in this section still hold. In some situations it could be more reasonable to expect that the proceeds of the stake sale will be retained and invested in new or existing projects rather than paid out to existing shareholders. The results will also hold if the target's stand-alone value is greater than zero. Finally, any private benefits that were to accrue to the blockholder would increase the premium paid.
V Conclusion
This paper shows how corporate control considerations can motivate firms to sell blocks of their own equity to other firms. I show that if there is some probability of a future control contest for the issuer and values for the firm in a takeover are unknown, the sale of a minority equity block can be used to implement an optimal mechanism that maximizes the combined expected payoff of the target and block purchaser. Ownership of the block commits the block owner to behave more aggressively in a control contest and allows the coalition of the target and block owner to extract some of the expected surplus of an outside bidder. In the model, this effect is traded off against the possibility that too much extraction will cause the outsider to decide not to investigate the target.
The model is intended to serve as a guide for future work by showing that corporate control can be a significant consideration in direct equity sales to strategic purchasers, and that ex post realizations, or non-realizations, of control outcomes do not necessarily imply ex ante motivations.
While the model is consistent with the existing evidence, more work is needed to determine whether these transactions are generally motivated by corporate control as modeled here or by other factors that have been proposed in the literature, such as improved cooperation in alliances. Toward that end, it would be interesting to test the model's prediction that selling firms that are not subsequently acquired will experience long-term negative abnormal returns if no takeover materializes, which has not been tested on a focused sample of direct sales. The comparative statics for the optimal stake size and the model's predictions for the stake sale premia may also be particularly fertile grounds for empirical study.
VI Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Turning to the outsider's IC and IR constraints, I first define the function
which equals the probability conditional on Z = z + under the mechanism (Q,M) that the outsider will get control of the target's assets when it reports its value as w O . I also define
which equals the outsider's expected payment conditional on Z = z + when it reports w O . Following Krishna (2002) (see his section 5.1.2), it is easy to show that incentive compatibility for the outsider requires that its expected payment given v O and Z = z + must satisfy
and that the function q O (v O ) must be non-decreasing. As noted in the text, individual rationality for the outsider requires that its total ex ante expected surplus from participating in the mechanism equal or exceed its investigation cost, or
which rewrites the participation constraint (2). Individual rationality for the outsider also requires that for all realizations of V O , the outsider's expected payoff be non-negative (i.e., m O (0) ≤ 0 and
. If this did not hold, the outsider would choose not to participate in the mechanism at the beginning of stage 3 when a value with a negative expected payoff was observed. If IR does hold, then choosing not to participate in the mechanism will be weakly dominated by participating.
With these constraints in place it is possible to characterize the problem faced by the bargainers, T and I, in stage 1 of the model. They will design the mechanism to maximize their joint continuation payoff, π Coalition , which equals the ex ante expected payment by the outsider plus the ex ante expectation of the realization of the insider's synergy value. This can be written as
where q I (v I ) is defined analogously to q O (v O ) as the probability conditional on Z = z + that the insider gets the target's assets if it has value v I . As noted above, any ex post payments from I to T do not enter the objective function since they maximize their joint surplus.
The bargainers' problem is thus to maximize (11) subject to the outsider's IC and IR constraints.
Substituting the main IC constraint (9) into the first term of the objective function (11) yields a new term
Changing the order of integration in the last term within the brackets and simplifying the entire expression yields
Taking this into account in both the objective function (11) and the IR/participation constraint (10), the bargainers' problem can be written as
subject to
)dv I must be non-decreasing. Letting γ, µ 1 and µ 2 be the non-negative multipliers on constraints (15), (16), and (17), respectively, the Lagrangian can be written as
First consider the expression inside the curly brackets, 
(Note: ties are safely ignored since they occur with zero probability). Since this maximizes the expression for any given v, the associated system of FOCs for all possible vectors v correspond to the FOC for the maximization of the integral. The FOCs for the remaining control variables are
and
Finally, we have the complementary slackness conditions (14) is monotonically decreasing in γ under the allocation rule defined by (19). As γ increases, the target's assets are allocated to the outsider in more states, and clearly each time this reallocation occurs for any state, this must reduce (14), which would be maximized by allocating the firm according to (19) with γ set equal to zero. Also note that when γ = 1, the allocation defined by (19) conforms to that in a standard second-price auction. This, together with my assumption that c O (1) is low enough that the outsider would choose to investigate if the chosen mechanism were a standard second-price auction, is therefore sufficient to prove that γ ∈ [0, 1] either is set so that the resulting Q(v,z) satisfies (2) with equality, or equals zero and (2) is satisfied with inequality.
To see that the mechanism is incentive compatible, first note that the payment rule for the positive synergy regime given in Proposition 1 can be re-written as
To see this note that under the given allocation rule, if
, and Q O (v I , t, z + ) = 0 will hold otherwise. Integrating this payment rule over v I holding v O constant, we get
where the last equality follows from changing the order of integration in the last term of the previous expression. Thus, we recover the outsider's IC condition (9). Finally, the monotone hazard
Proof of Proposition 2:
The discussion in the text proves that the transfer of
shares of equity in T followed in stage 3 by a second-price or equivalent auction implements the allocation rule described in Proposition 1. That discussion also shows that the prescribed behavior in the auction will be incentive compatible for both potential acquirers (since their optimal bidding strategies are explicitly derived) once the equity is transferred. Now consider the outsider's individual rationality constraint. This will be satisfied if the payment rule for the outsider for the mechanism described in Proposition 2 is equivalent to that in Proposition 1. This is clearly the case given than b I = b * in equilibrium. Thus, participation is weakly dominant for the outsider at stage 3.
The derivation of Proposition 1 assumed a contract between the target and insider guaranteeing the insider's truthful participation. However, the solution in Proposition 2, in accord with the dropping of that assumption, is predicated on the fact that the insider acts independently and rationally following the negotiation and transfer of equity in Stage 1. Thus, it remains to prove that the purchase of equity and participation in the auction are incentive compatible and individually rational for the insider. Individual rationality and incentive compatibility for the purchase of equity at the price P is clearly satisfied since I have assumed efficient bargaining between the partners and that mutually beneficial agreement is possible (the coalition's maximized joint surplus, π T + π I , exceeds the sum of disagreement payoffs, D T + D I ). Further, participation in the auction is clearly individually rational (and thus weakly dominant) since c I (1) = 0 and the insider's expected payment from participation in the auction is non-negative for all v O ∈ χ I . This last point is clear from the derivation of the insider's optimal bid in the text; it always has the option of bidding zero and getting an expected payoff of zero, so its optimal bid must yield a nonnegative expected payoff. Finally, as noted above, incentive compatibility for bidding in the second-price auction is guaranteed since the insider chooses its bid to maximize its expected payoff. ¥ Proof of Proposition 3: Follows directly from the fact that the outsider's IR constraint (2) holds with equality in equilibrium (assuming it is not satisfied at γ = 0), the left-hand side of the constraint is increasing in s, the right-hand side is increasing in c O (1), and the left-hand side is increasing in γ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4:
Using the results from the proof of Proposition 1, the outsider's IR constraint (2) can be re-written as
Now note that a positive stochastic shift in F I (·) will affect (25) only via the resulting change in
). Thus, since a positive stochastic shift in F I (·) reduces F I (·) at every point, q O (v O ) must decrease with the shift at every v O , which implies that the left-hand side of (25) decreases. Therefore, (2) must hold with equality at a higher γ, which is equivalent to a smaller optimal stake size. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
The premium is clearly increasing in θ T , so it suffices to prove the result for θ T = 1. We therefore require proof that
First note that π T represents the expected payoff of one share held by an outside party. For any given realization of the vector of values v, this equals (1 − α * ) times the expected sales price of the target's assets, denoted by E[price]. Thus, we can rewrite (26) as
Since both sides of this equation are expectations taken over all possible realizations of v, it suffices to prove that
holds conditional on v for every possible v, and (27) holds for some v.
Let π I | v − D I | v represent the left-hand-side of (27) and (28) as measured conditional on v.
Since a second-price auction is held in stage 3 whether or not an agreement is reached in stage 1, followed by a takeover of the selling firm within two years.
2 Allen and Phillips (2000) state that 84 of the 402 issuers in their sample are acquired in the period beginning two years after the initial block purchase, with 11 of those 84 involving acquisitions by the block purchaser (the initial block purchases are not all direct sales, however). They do not provide information on how many issuing firms are acquired within two years of the block purchase; these transactions are excluded from their sample. Also, their sample does not include private issuers.
3 See Burkart (1995) , Singh (1998) and Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) .
4 Cooperation in an alliance or other product market relationship could also generate synergistic gains for the target and acquiring firm. This is excluded from the model for the sake of simplicity.
5 Note that these studies do not focus exclusively on stakes purchased directly from the issuing firm.
6 Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) find that 12.8% of the 759 alliances in their sample involve a direct equity sale. In a sample of 402 purchases of blocks of equity by corporate acquirers, Allen and Phillips (2000) report that approximately 37% of the deals involve some form of product market cooperation between the firms. Andersen Consulting estimates that the total value of strategic alliances will approach $25 to $40 trillion by 2004. Robinson (2001) finds that the number of alliances and joint ventures has been growing at a rate of approximately 16% per year since 1985.
7 The source of any takeover synergies is intentionally left unspecified. The term is intended to represent any operational or financial benefit that may arise from control of the target's assets.
8 This structure is used to introduce uncertainty over whether a takeover will occur in the simplest possible way without loss of insight. It is similar to the structure of uncertainty in Fishman (1988) .
9 Any alternative assumption that ruled out efficient bargaining among the three players prior to investigation would also suffice here. For example, one could assume that the insider is able to (partially) learn its value before the outsider shows up.
